

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 L-03 EUR-25 DODE-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11

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DRAFTED BY IO:PPR:NAPELCOVITS

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APPROVED BY IO:DHPOPPER

IO - MR. HERZ

L/UNA - MR. NELSON

IO/UNP - MR. ROTHENBERG

DUR/SOV - MR. WILKINSON

OSD/ISA - (OL. SITES

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 143935

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, UR

SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPING TALKS WITH SMUN (TENTATIVELY
SCHEDULED FOR JULY 23)

1. WE SHARE YOUR JUDGMENT THAT BY REVERTING TO UNFORTH-
COMING POSITION OF SEPTEMBER 1970 (USUN 1879, 11 SEPT 70),
SOVS HOLD OUT LITTLE PROMISE FOR REACHING ACCOMMODATION ON
KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON GUIDELINES. ESSENTIAL
PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO BE (A) SOVIET RESISTANCE TO GIVING
SYG NECESSARY LATITUDE AND (B) THEIR ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER
US INTO SIGNING ON TO ARRANGEMENT WHICH PERPETUATES
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF PERMANENT SC MEMBERS AT EVERY STATE.
NEVERTHELESS, WE (ONCUR YOU SHOULD AGREE HOLD ANOTHER TALK
WITH OVINNIKOV BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR MOSCOW.

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2. DEPT CONCURS WITH LINE YOU PROPOSE IN PARA 10 REFTTEL.

MAIN MESSAGE OVINNIKOV SHOULD TAKE BACK TO MOSCOW IS THAT WE HAVE ADEQUATELY CLARIFIED AND INTERPRETED US POSITION AND IT IS NOW UP TO MOSCOW TO COME UP WITH POSITIVE AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS THAT MEET OUR CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY FLEXIBILITY ON DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN SC AND SYG. ALSO, THAT ANY SET OF GUIDELINES MUST IN THE END BE ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO US TWO BUT TO MIDDLE POWERS ON WHOM UN RELIES FOR SUCCESS OF PEACEKEEPING AND TO PARTIES WHOSE CONSENT AND COOPERATION ARE PRE-REQUISITE TO PEACEKEEPING MISSION.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE, IN ORDER TO COUNTER MISINTERPRETATION SOVS HAVE PLACED ON TENTATIVE PROCEDURES DISCUSSED AT WORKING LEVEL TALKS IN 1970 (CF PARA 2 OF REFTEL) SUGGEST YOU REVIEW WITH OVINNIKOV OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WAY PRODEDURES IN OUR PROPOSAL WERE SUPPOSED TO WORK. OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO SCORE POINTS IN SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF WORDING OF 1970 WORKING PAPER BUT TO REAFFIRM WHAT WE WILL CONSIDER WORKABLE AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SET OF PROCEDURES THAT WILL MEET EVERYONE'S CONCERNS AND BE ACCEPTABLE TO PEACEKEEPING COMMITTEE. YOU MIGHT POINT OUT THAT MUCH OF THIS IS EXPLAINED IN MEMORANDUM THAT ACCOMPANIED U.S. PROPOSALS (CIRCULATED IN UN IN MARCH 1972 (AS WELL AS IN THE WORKING PAPER OF JUNE 1970).

A. SC COULD OF COURSE WRITE INTO MANDATE ANYTHING IT WISHED AND MAKE ANY ALTERATIONS IT WISHED, BUT ONCE OPERATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED, ADEQUATE POLITICAL SUPERVISION OR PEACEKEEPING MISSION COULD BE MAINTAINED BY ESTABLISHING COMMITTEE TO PROVIDE A "WATCHING BRIEF" WHICH WOULD LINK SC TO SYG. SUCH MECHANISM WOULD ENSURE THAT SYG WOULD BE POLITICALLY RESPONSIVE WITHOUT REQUIRING FORMAL SC ACTION AND WOULD CONSULT ON IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL DECISIONS.

B. A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ART. 29 SUBSIDIARY ORGAN, TO CONSIST OF THE BIG FOUR (OR FIVE), WAS MEANT TO SERVE AS NUCLEUS OF THE COMMITTEE, IN ORDER (L) TO HELP GET THE MISSION LAUNCHED ON MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BASIS BEFORE FULL

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COMMITTEE (INCLUDING TROOP CONTRIBUTORS) HAD BEEN ORGANIZED AND (2) TO SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR CONCERTING VIEWS OF PERMANENT MEMBERS IN INFORMAL WAY TO PRECLUDE NEED FOR FORMAL RENOVING OF SC. IT WOULD BE BOTH UNWISE AND SELF-DEFEATING TO VIEW THIS SUBCOMMITTEE OF PERMANENT MEMBERS AS MECHANISM FOR ENSURING BIG POWER HEGEMONY ONCE FULL COMMITTEE IS ESTABLISHED. MIDDLE POWERS ON WHOM PEACEKEEPING IS SO DEPENDENT MIGHT BE ALIENATED AND DIS-

COURAGED FROM PARTICIPATING. INFORMAL CONSULTATION OF PERMANENT MEMBERS IN FRAMEWORK OF FULL SC COMMITTEE WOULD ENSURE THAT OUR COMMON INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED.

C. WE DID NOT ENVISAGE FULL COMMITTEE OR SUB-COMMITTEE AS "DIRECTORATE" OR AS MECHANISM FOR MAKING OPERATIONAL DECISIONS. ALSO WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SINCE THESE ARE BASICALLY CONSULTATIVE AND ADVISORY BODIES, WE D NOT ENVISAGE VOTING EITHER IN COMMITTEE OR SUB-COMMITTEE. AS WE MADE CLEAR IN 1970 WE DO NOT EXPECT FULL COMMITTEE (OR SUBCOMMITTEE) TO MEET OFTEN ONCE OPERATION IS LAUNCHED BUT ASSUME SYG WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF VIEWS OF MEMBERS (INCLUDING PERMANENT MEMBERS) BOTH AS TO SUBSTANCE AND TO SOURCE AS HE MAKES OPERATIONAL DECISIONS. IF COMMITTEE VOICES OBJECTION TO OPERATIONAL ACT OF SYG (TAKEN PURSUANT TO RESPONSIBILITIES HE AUTHORIZED TO UNDERTAKE) WE WOULD ASSUME HE WOULD RECONSIDER AND SOLUTION COULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH CONSULTATION.

D. WITH RESPECT TO PARA 2 OF REFTTEL, PROCEDURES FOR COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE WE ENVISAGED IN 1970 (AND WHICH USUN WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXPLAIN ORALLY TO SMUN, PER STATE 164028 OF OCT. 5, 1970) STILL APPEARS VALID. WE WOULD INVITE SOVS TO ADDRESS THESE POINTS. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PROCEDURE ARE: (1) KEY SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, SUCH AS COMPOSITION OF MISSION AND DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS, WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY FOUR POWER (OR FIVE POWER) SUBCOMMITTEE AT TIME OPERATION IS LAUNCHED AND FOR THIS PURPOSE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD OPERATE ON BASIS OF CONSENSUS; (2) AFTER OPERATION LAUNCHED IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL MATTERS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY FULL COMMITTEE WITH SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING INFORMALLY AS APPROPRIATE TO SEEK TO CONCERT VIEWS OF PERMANENT MEMBERS; (3) EITHER

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SYG OR MEMBER OF COMMITTEE COULD INITIATE CONSULTATION BETWEEN SYG AND COMMITTEE AND AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO WORK MATTERS OUT ON AN INFORMAL BASIS; (4) IT IS REALISTIC TO ASSUME SYG WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION TO VIEWS OF COMMITTEE AND PARTICULARLY TO PERMANENT MEMBERS, BUT IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT IN COMMITTEE OR AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS HE COULD TAKE SUCH DECISIONS AS HE FELT NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS OF MISSION. (FYI YOU WILL NOTE THAT IN VERSION PRESENTED TO SCHAUFEL BY OVANNIKOV THIS LAST VERY IMPORTANT PROVISION RESPECTING LATITUDE OF SYG WAS OMITTED. END FYI); AND, (5) IF ANY MEMBER FELT THAT FURTHER CMTE CONSIDERATION OR SC CONSIDERATION WAS REQUIRED HE COULD CALL FOR MEETING OF CMTE OR SC.

4. ABOVE IS POSITION WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN AND TO WHICH WE BELIEVE SOVS HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY RESPONDED. SMUN WILL RECALL THAT AT THE TIME ASSISTANT SECRETARY DE PALMA IN CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET CHARGE VORONTSOV IN WASHINGTON AND MENDELICH AND OVINNIKOV IN NEW YORK NOTED THAT SOVIET PAPER OF SEPT 1970 HAD MISSTATED US POSITION AND THAT IT NOT US VIEW THAT "NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION" ON ESTABLISHMENT AND CONDUCT OF OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF SC PERMANENT MEMBERS. DE PALMA CONFIRMED THAT US WAS PREPARED TO REQUIRE SYG TO CONSULT BIG FOUR (OR FIVE) BEFORE ACTING TO CARRY OUT PEACEKEEPING MISSION AUTHORIZED BY SC BUT THAT IN ABSENCE UNANIMITY AMONG PERMANENT MEMBERS SYG SHOULD TAKE ACTION IF HE DEEMED IT NECESSARY, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO ANY CONTRARY DE(ISION TAKEN BY SC. SMUN FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS RESERVATION AND INDICATED THIS POINT WOULD BE MADE TO MOSCOW. THEY HAVE NEVER ADDRESSED THIS POINT SPECIFICALLY ??THER IN ORAL PRESENTATION OR IN THE TWO WRITTEN PAPERS, THE MEMORANDUM OF SEPT. 1970 AND THE SOVIET PROPOSALS BY MALIK GAVE US IN JULY 1971 (WHICH LATER WAS CIRCULATED AS A UN DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE USSR, DATED MARCH 17,1972.)

5. OVINNIKOV SHOULD BE MADE AWARE THAT WE ARE READY TO CONSULT ON POSSIBILITIES FOR REACHING ACCOMMODATION BUT, THAT IF ANY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SOVS ADDRESS SERIOUSLY AND IN POSITIVE MANNER SPECIFIC
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PROCEDURES WE HAVE PROPQSED OR PRESENT CONCRETE COUNTER-PROPOSALS RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO GET US TO REFORMULATE OUR PROPOSAL SO THAT IT REFLECTS THEIR POSITION. RUSH

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